Social advertisement is one of the fastest growing sectors in the digital advertisement landscape: ads in the form of promoted posts are shown in the feed of users of a social networking platform, along with normal social posts; if a user clicks on a promoted post, the host (social network owner) is paid a fixed amount from the advertiser. In this context, allocating ads to users is typically performed by maximizing click-through-rate, i.e., the likelihood that the user will click on the ad. However, this simple strategy fails to leverage the fact the ads can propagate virally through the network, from endorsing users to their followers.
INTRODUCTION
Advertising on social networking and microblogging platforms is one of the fastest growing sectors in digital advertising, further fueled by the explosion of investments in mobile ads. Social ads are typically implemented by platforms such as Twitter, Tumblr, and Facebook through the mechanism of promoted posts shown in the "timeline" (or feed) of their users. A promoted post can be a video, an image, or simply a textual post containing an advertising message. Similar to organic (non-promoted) posts, promoted posts can propagate from user to user in the network by means of social actions such as "likes", "shares", or "reposts". 1 Below, we blur the distinction between these different types of action, and generically refer to them all as clicks. These actions have two important aspects in common: (1) they can be seen as an explicit form of acceptance or endorsement of the advertising message; (2) they allow the promoted posts to propagate, so that they might be visible to the "friends" or "followers" of the endorsing (i.e., clicking) users. In particular, the system may supplement the ads with social proofs such as "X, Y, and 3 other friends clicked on it", which may further increase the chance that a user will click [2, 26] .
This type of advertisements are usually associated with a cost per engagement (CPE) model. The advertiser enters into an agreement with the platform owner, called the host: the advertiser agrees to pay the host an amount cpe(i) for each click received by its ad i. The clicks may come not only from the users who saw i as a promoted ad post, but also their (transitive) followers, who saw it because of viral propagation. The agreement also specifies a budget Bi, that is, the advertiser ai will pay the host the total cost of all the clicks received by i, up to a maximum of Bi. Naturally, posts from different advertisers may be promoted by the host concurrently.
Given that promoted posts are inserted in the timeline of the users, they compete with organic social posts and with one another for a user's attention. A large number of promoted posts (ads) pushed to a user by the system would disrupt user experience, leading to disengagement and eventually abandonment of the platform. To mitigate this, the host limits the number of promoted posts that it shows to a user within a fixed time window, e.g., a maximum of 5 ads per day per user: we call this bound the user-attention bound, κu, which may be user specific [20] .
A subtle point here is that ads directly promoted by the host count against user attention bound. On the contrary, an ad i that flows from a user u to her follower v should not count toward v's attention bound. In fact, v is receiving ad i from user u, whom she is voluntarily following: as such, it cannot be considered "promoted".
A naïve ad allocation 2 would match each ad with the users most likely to click on the ad. However, the above strategy fails to leverage the possibility of ads propagating virally from endorsing users to their followers. We next illustrate the gains achieved by an allocation that takes viral ad propagation into account. Viral ad propagation: why it matters. For our example we use the toy social network in Fig. 1 . We assume that each time a user clicks on a promoted post, the system produces a social proof for such engagement action, thanks to which her followers might be influenced to click as well.
In order to model the propagation of (promoted) posts in the network, we can borrow from the rich body of work done in diffusion of information and innovations in social networks. In particular, the Independent Cascade (IC) model [19] , adapted to our setting, says that once a user u clicks on an ad, she has one independent attempt to try to influence each of her neighbors v. Each attempt succeeds with a probability p i u,v which depends on the topics of the specific ad i and the influence exerted by u on her neighbor v. The propagation stops when no new users get influenced. Similarly, we model the intrinsic relevance of a promoted post i to a user u, as the probability δ(u, i) that u will click on ad i, based on the content of the ad and her own interest profile, i.e., the prior probability that the user will click on a promoted post in the absence of any social proof.
Since the model is probabilistic, we focus on the number of clicks that an ad receives in expectation. Formal details of the propagation model, the topic model, and the definition of expected revenue are deferred to § 3.
Consider the example in Fig. 1 , where we assume peer influence probabilities (on edges) are equal for all the four ads {a, b, c, d}. The figure also reports δ(u, i) and advertiser budgets. For each advertiser, CPE is 1 and the attention bound for every user is 1, i.e., no user wants more than one ad promoted to her by the host. The expected revenue for an allocation is the same as the resulting expected number of clicks, as the CPE is 1. Below, for simplicity, we round all numbers to the second decimal after calculating them all.
Let us consider two ways of allocating users to ads by the host. In allocation A, the host matches each user to her top preference(s) based on δ(u, i), subject to not violating the attention bound. This results in ad a being assigned to all six users, since it has the highest engagement probability for every user. No further ads may be promoted without violating the attention bound. In allocation B, the host recognizes viral propagation of ads and thus assigns a to v1 and v2, b to v3, c to v4 and v5, and d to v6.
Under allocation A, clicks on a may come from all six users: v1, v2 click on a with probability 0.9. However, v3 clicks on a w.p.
(1 − (1 − 0.9 · 0.2) 2 (1 − 0.9)) = 0.93. This is obtained by combining three factors: v3's engagement probability of 0.9 with ad a, and probability 0.9 · 0.2 with which each of v1, v2 clicks on a and influences v3 to click on a. In a similar way one can derive the probability of clicking on a for v4, v5, and v6 (reported in the figure). The overall expected revenue for allocation A is the sum of all clicking probabilities: 2 × 0.9 + 0.93 + 2 × 0.95 + 0.92 = 5.55.
Under allocation B, the ad a is promoted to only v1 and v2 (which click on it w.p. 0.9). Every other user that clicks on a does so solely based on social influence. Thus, v3 clicks on a w.p. 1−(1−0.9·0.2) 2 = 0.33. Similarly one can derive the probability of clicking on a for v4, v5, and v6 (reported in the figure). Contributions to the clicks on b can only come from nodes v3, v4, v5, v6. They click on b, respectively, w.p. 0.8, 0.8 · 0.5 = 0.4, 0.8 · 0.5 = 0.4, and 1 − (1 − 0.8 · 0.5 · 0.1) 2 = 0.08.
Finally, it can be verified that the expected number of clicks on ad c is 0.7 + 0.7 + (1 − (1 − 0.7 · 0.1) 2 ), while on d is just 0.6. The overall number of expected clicks under allocation B is 6.3. Observations: (1) Careful allocation of users to ads that takes viral ad propagation into account can outperform an allocation that merely focuses on immediate clicking likelihood based on the content relevance of the ad to a user's interest profile. It is easy to construct instances where the gap between the two can be arbitrarily high by just replicating the gadget in Fig. 1 .
• p i uv (on the edges) are the same ∀i ∈ {a, b, c, d} • ∀u ∈ {v 1 , . . . , v 6 } : δ(u, a) = 0.9, δ(u, b) = 0.8, δ(u, c) = 0.7, δ(u, d) = 0.6
Expected number of clicks = 2×0.9+0.93+2×0.95+0.92 = 5.55
Expected number of clicks = 2 · 0.9 + 0.33 + 2 · 0.16 + 0.03 + 0.8 + 2 · 0.4 + 0.08 + 2 · 0.7 + 0.14 + 0.6 = 6.3.
Figure 1:
Illustrating viral ad propagation. For simplicity, we round all numbers to the second decimal.
(2) Even though allocation A ignores the effect of viral ad propagation, it still benefits from the latter, as shown in the calculations. This naturally motivates finding allocations that expressly exploit such propagation in order to maximize the expected revenue.
In this context, we study the problem of how to strategically allocate users to the advertisers, leveraging social influence and the propensity of ads to propagate. The major challenges in solving this problem are as follows. Firstly, the host needs to strike a balance between assigning ads to users who are likely to click and assigning them to "influential" users who are likely to boost further propagation of the ads. Moreover, influence may well depend on the "topic" of the ad. E.g., u may influence its neighbor v to different extents on cameras versus health-related products. Therefore, ads which are close in a topic space will naturally compete for users that are influential in the same area of the topic space. Summarizing, a good allocation strategy needs to take into account the different CPEs and budgets for different advertisers, users' attention bound and interests, and ads' topical distributions.
An even more complex challenge is brought in by the fact that uncontrolled virality could be undesirable for the host, as it creates room for exploitation by the advertisers: hoping to tap uncontrolled virality, an advertiser might declare a lower budget for its marketing campaign, aiming at the same large outcome with a smaller cost. Thus, from the host perspective, it is important to make sure the expected revenue from an advertiser is as close to the budget as possible: both undershooting and overshooting the budget results in a regret for the host, as illustrated in the following example. EXAMPLE 1. Consider again our example in Fig. 1 , but this time along with the budgets specified the four advertisers are Ba = 4, B b = 2, Bc = 2, B d = 1. Then, rounding to the first decimal, allocation A leads to an overall regret of |4 − 5.6| + |2 − 0| + |2 − 0| + |1 − 0| = 6.6: the expected revenue exceeds the budget for advertiser a by 1.6 and falls short of other advertiser budgets by 2, 2, 1 respectively. Similarly, for allocation B, the regret is |4 − 2.5| + |2 − 1.7| + |2 − 1.5| + |1 − 0.6| = 2.7.
The host knows it will not be paid beyond the budget of each advertiser, so that any excess above the budget is essentially "free service" given away by the host, which causes regret, and any shortfall w.r.t. the budget is a lost revenue opportunity which causes regret as well. This creates a challenging trade-off: on the one hand, the host aims at leveraging virality and the network effect to improve advertising efficacy, while on the other hand the host wants to avoid giving away free service due to uncontrolled virality. Contributions and roadmap. In this paper we make the following major contributions:
• We propose a novel problem domain of allocating users to advertisers for promoting advertisement posts, taking advantage of network effect, while paying attention to important practical factors like relevance of ad, effect of social proof, user's attention bound, and limited advertiser budgets ( § 3). • We formally define the problem of minimizing regret in allocating users to ads ( § 3), and show that it is NP-hard and is NP-hard to approximate within any factor ( § 4). • We develop a simple greedy algorithm and establish an upper bound on the regret it achieves as a function of advertisers' total budget ( § 4.1). • We then devise a scalable instantiation of the greedy algorithm by leveraging the notion of random reverse-reachable sets [5, 25] ( § 5). • Our extensive experimentation on four real datasets confirms that our algorithm is scalable and it delivers high quality solutions, significantly outperforming natural baselines ( § 6).
To the best of our knowledge, regret minimization in the context of promoting multiple ads in a social network, subject to budget and attention bounds has not been studied before. Related work is discussed in § 2, while § 7 concludes the paper discussing extensions and future work.
RELATED WORK
Substantial work has been done on viral marketing, which mainly focuses on a key algorithmic problem -influence maximization [7, 17, 19] . Kempe et al. [19] formulated influence maximization as a discrete optimization problem: given a social graph and a number k, find a set S of k nodes, such that by activating them one maximizes the expected spread of influence σ(S) under a certain propagation model, e.g., the Independent Cascade (IC) model. Influence maximization is NP-hard, but the function σ(S) is monotone 3 and submodular 4 [19] . Exploiting these properties, the simple greedy algorithm that at each step extends the seed
set with the node providing the largest marginal gain, provides a (1 − 1/e)-approximation to the optimum [24] . The greedy algorithm is computationally prohibitive, since selecting the node with the largest marginal gain is #P-hard [7] , and is typically approximated by numerous Monte Carlo simulations [19] . However, running many such simulations is extremely costly, and thus considerable effort has been devoted to developing efficient and scalable influence maximization algorithms: in §5 we will review some of the latest advances in this area which help us devise our algorithms.
Datta et al. [9] study influence maximization with multiple items, under a user attention constraint. However, as in classical influence maximization, their objective is to maximize the overall influence spread, and the budget is w.r.t. the size of the seed set, so without any CPE model. Their diffusion model is the (topic-blind) IC model, which also doesn't model the competition among similar items. They propose a simple greedy approximation algorithm and a heuristic algorithm for fair allocation of seeds with no guarantees. Du et al. [12] study influence maximization over multiple non-competing products subject to user attention constraints and product budget (knapsack) constraints, and develop approximation algorithms in a continuous time setting. A noteworthy feature of our work is that, as will be shown in §6, the budgets we use are such that thousands of seeds are required to minimize regret. Scalability of algorithms for selecting thousands of seeds over large networks has not been demonstrated before. Lin et al. [20] study the problem of maximizing influence spread from a website's perspective: how to dynamically push items to users based on user preference and social influence. The push mechanism is also subject to user attention bounds. Their framework is based on Markov Decision Processes (MDPs).
Our work departs from the body of work in this field by looking at the possibility of integrating viral marketing into existing social advertising models and by studying a fundamentally different objective: minimize host's regret.
While social advertising is still in its infancy, it fits in the more general (and mature) area of computational advertising that has attracted a lot of interest during the last decade. The central problem of computational advertising is to find the "best match" between a given user in a given context and a suitable advertisement. The context could be a user entering a query in a search engine ("sponsored search"), reading a web page ("content match" and "display ads"), or watching a movie on a portable device, etc.
The most typical example is sponsored search: search engines show ads deemed relevant to user-issued queries, in the hope of maximizing click-through rates and in turn, revenue. Revenue maximization in this context is formalized as the well-known Adwords problem [22] . We are given a set Q of keywords and N bidders with their daily budgets and bids for each keyword in Q. During a day, a sequence of words (all from Q) would arrive online and the task is to assign each word to one bidder upon its arrival, with the objective of maximizing revenue for the given day while respecting the budgets of all bidders. This can be seen as a generalized online bipartite matching problem, and by using linear programming techniques, a (1 − 1/e) competitive ratio is achieved [22] . Considerable work has been done in sponsored search and display ads [10, 13, 14, 16, 23] . For a comprehensive treatment, see a recent survey [21] . Our work fundamentally differs from this as we are concerned with the virality of ads when making allocations: this concept is still largely unexplored in computational advertising.
Recently, Tucker [26] and Bakshy et al. [2] conducted field experiments on Facebook and demonstrated that adding social proofs to sponsored posts in Facebook's News Feed significantly increased the click-through rate. Their findings empirically confirm the benefits of social influence, paving the way for the application of viral marketing in social advertising, as we do in our work.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
The Ingredients. The computational problem studied in this paper is from the host perspective. The host owns: (i) a directed social graph G = (V, E), where an arc (u, v) means that v follows u, thus v can see u's posts and can be influenced by u; (ii) a topic model for ads and users' interest, defined on a space of K topics; (iii) a topic-aware influence propagation model defined on the social graph G and the topic model.
The key idea behind the topic modeling is to introduce a hidden variable Z that can range among K states. Each topic (i.e., state of the latent variable) represents an abstract interest/pattern and intuitively models the underlying cause for each data observation (a user clicking on an ad). In our setting the host owns a precomputed probabilistic topic model. The actual method used for producing the model is not important at this stage: it could be, e.g., the popular Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [4] , or any other method. What is relevant is that the topic model maps each ad i to a topic distribution γi over the latent topic space, formally:
The propagation model governs the way that ads propagate in the social network driven by social influence. In this work, we extend a simple topic-aware propagation model introduced by Barbieri et al. [3] , with Click-Through Probabilities (CTPs) for seeds: we refer to the set of users Si that receive ad i directly as a promoted post from the host as the seed set for ad i. In the Topic-aware Independent Cascade model (TIC) of [3] , the propagation proceeds as follows: when a node u first clicks an ad i, it has one chance of influencing each inactive neighbor v, independently of the history thus far. This succeeds with a probability that is the weighted average of the arc probability w.r.t. the topic distribution of the ad i:
For each topic z and for a seed node u, the probability p z H,u represents the likelihood of u clicking on a promoted post for topic z. Thus the CTP δ(u, i) that u clicks on the promoted post i in absence of any social proof, is the weighted average (as in Eq. (1)) of the probabilities p z H,u w.r.t. the topic distribution of i. In our extended TIC-CTP model, each u ∈ Si accepts to be a seed, i.e., clicks on ad i, with probability δ(u, i) when targeted. The rest of the propagation process remains the same as in TIC.
Following the literature on influence maximization we denote with σi(Si) the expected number of clicks (according to the TIC-CTP model) for ad i when the seed set is Si. The corresponding expected revenue is Πi(Si) = σi(Si) · cpe(i), where cpe(i) is the cost-per-engagement that ai and the host have agreed on.
We observe that for a fixed ad i, with topic distribution γi, the TIC-CTP model boils down to the standard Independent Cascade (IC) model [19] with CTPs, where again, a seed may activate with a probability. We next expose the relationship between the expected spread a σ ic (S) for the classical IC model without CTPs, and the expected spread under the TIC-CTP model for a given ad i.
LEMMA 1. Given an instance of the TIC-CTP model, and a fixed ad i, with topic distribution γi, build an instance of IC by setting the probability over each edge (u, v) as in Eq. 1. Now, consider any node u, and any set S of nodes. Let δ(u, i) be the CTP for u clicking on the promoted post i. Then we have
PROOF. The proof relies on the possible world semantics. For the IC model [19] , consider a graph G = (V, E) with influence probability pu,v on each edge (u, v) ∈ E. A possible world, denoted X, is a deterministic graph generated as follows. For each edge (u, v) ∈ E, we flip a biased coin: with probability pu,v, the edge is declared "live", and with probability 1 − pu,v, it is declared "blocked".
Define an indicator function IX (S, v), which takes on 1 if v is reachable by S via a path consisting entirely of live edges in X, and 0 otherwise. In the IC model,
Notice that for a node to be active in a possible world, it must be reachable from a seed. In each of the possible worlds, node u has probability δ(u, i) to accept to become a seed. Thus, in the TIC-CTP model, we have:
This directly leads to
which was to be shown.
A corollary of the above lemma is that for a fixed γi, the expected spread σi(·) function under the TIC-CTP model, inherits the properties of monotonicity and submodularity from the IC model (see Sec. 2 and [3, 19] ). In turn, Πi(Si) = cpe(i) · σi(Si) is also monotone and submodular, being a non-negative linear combination of monotone submodular functions.
Budget and Regret. As in any other advertisement model, we assume that each advertiser ai has a finite budget Bi for a campaign on ad i, which limits the maximum amount that ai will pay the host. The host needs to allocate seeds to each of the ads that it has agreed to promote, resulting in an allocation S = (S1, ..., S h ). The expected revenue from the campaign may fall short of the budget (i.e., Πi(Si) < Bi) or overshoot it (i.e., Πi(Si) > Bi). An advertiser's natural goal is to make its expected revenue as close to Bi as possible: the former situation is lost opportunity to make money whereas the latter amounts to "free service" by the host to the advertiser. Both are undesirable. Thus, one option to define the host's regret for seed set allocation Si for advertiser ai is as |Bi − Πi(Si)|.
Note that this definition of regret has the drawback that it does not discriminate between small and large seed sets: given two seed sets S1 and S2 with the same regret as defined above, and with |S1| |S2|, this definition does not prefer one over the other. In practice, it is desirable to achieve a low regret with a small number of seeds. By drawing on the inspiration from the optimization literature [6] , where an additional penalty corresponding to the complexity of the solution is added to the error function to discourage overfitting, we propose to add a similar penalty term to discourage the use of large seed sets. Hence we define the overall regret as
Here, λ·|Si| can be seen as a penalty for the use of a seed set: the larger its size, the greater the penalty. This discourages the choice of a large number of poor quality seeds to exhaust the budget. When λ = 0, no penalty is levied and the "raw" regret corresponding to the budget alone is measured. We assume w.l.o.g. that the scalar λ encapsulates CPE such that the term λ|Si| is in the same monetary unit as Bi. How small/large should λ be? We will address this question in the next section.
The overall regret from an allocation S = (S1, ..., S h ) to all advertisers is
Ri(Si).
(4) EXAMPLE 2. In Example 1, the regrets reported for allocations A (6.6) and B (2.7) correspond to λ = 0. When λ = 0.1, the regrets change to 6.6 + 0.1 × 6 = 7.2 for A and to 2.
As noted in the introduction, in practice, the number of ads that can be promoted to a user may be limited. The host can even personalize this number depending on users' activity. We model this using an attention bound κu for user u. An allocation S = (S1, ..., S h ) is called valid provided for every user u ∈ V , |{Si ∈ S | u ∈ Si}| ≤ κu, i.e., no more than κu ads are promoted to u by the allocation. We are now ready to formally state the problem we study.
PROBLEM 1 (REGRET-MINIMIZATION). We are given h advertisers a1, . . . , a h , where each ai has an ad i described by topicdistribution γi, a budget Bi, and a cost-per-engagement cpe(i). Also given is a social graph G = (V, E) with a probability p z u,v for each edge (u, v) ∈ E and each topic z ∈ [1, K], an attention bound κu, ∀u ∈ V , and a penalty parameter λ ≥ 0. The task is to compute a valid allocation S = (S1, . . . , S h ) that minimizes the overall regret:
Discussion. Note that Πi(Si) denotes the expected revenue from advertiser ai. In reality, the actual revenue depends on the number of engagements the ad actually receives. Thus, the uncertainty in Πi(Si) may result in a loss of revenue. Another concern could be that regret on the positive side (Πi(Si) > Bi) is more acceptable than on the negative side (Πi(Si) < Bi), as one can argue that maximizing revenue is a more critical goal even if it comes at the expense of a small and reasonable amount of free service. Our framework can accommodate such concerns and can easily address them. For instance, instead of defining raw regret as |Bi − Πi(Si)|, we can define it as
The idea is to artificially boost the budget Bi with parameter β allowing maximization of revenue while keeping the free service within a modest limit. This small change has no impact on the validity of our results and algorithms. Theorem 2 provides an upper bound on the regret achieved by our allocation algorithm ( § 4.1). The bound remains intact except that in place of the original budget Bi, we should use the boosted budget B i . This remark applies to all our results. We henceforth study the problem as defined in Problem 1.
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
We first show that REGRET-MINIMIZATION is not only NP-hard to solve optimally, but is also NP-hard to approximate within any factor (Theorem 1). On the positive side, we propose a greedy algorithm and conduct a careful analysis to establish a bound on the regret it can achieve as a function of the budget (Theorems 2-4). THEOREM 1. REGRET-MINIMIZATION is NP-hard and is NPhard to approximate within any factor. PROOF. We prove hardness for the special case where λ = 0, using a reduction from 3-PARTITION [15] .
Given a set X = {x1, ..., x3m} of positive integers whose sum is C, with xi ∈ (C/4m, C/2m), ∀i, 3-PARTITION asks whether X can be partitioned into m disjoint 3-element subsets, such that the sum of elements in each partition is the same (= C/m). This problem is known to be strongly NP-hard, i.e., it remains NP-hard even if the integers xi are bounded above by a polynomial in m [15] . Thus, we may assume that C is bounded by a polynomial in m.
Given an instance I of 3-PARTITION, we construct an instance J of REGRET-MINIMIZATION as follows. First, we set the number of advertisers h = m and let the cost-per-engagement (CPE) be 1 for all advertisers. Then, we construct a directed bipartite graph G = (U ∪ V, E): for each number xi, G has one node ui ∈ U with xi − 1 outneighbors in V , with all influence probabilities set to 1. We refer to members of U (resp., V ) as "U " nodes (resp., "V " nodes) below. Set all advertiser budgets to Bi = C/m, 1 ≤ i ≤ m and the attention bound of every user to 1. This will result in a total of C nodes in the instance of REGRET-MINIMIZATION. Since C is bounded by a polynomial in m, the reduction is achieved in polynomial time.
We next show that if REGRET-MINIMIZATION can be solved in polynomial time, so can 3-PARTITION, implying hardness. To that end, assume there exists an algorithm A that solves REGRET-MINIMIZATION optimally. We can use A to distinguish between YES-and NO-instances of 3-PARTITION as follows. Run A on J to yield a seed set allocation S = (S1, ..., Sm). We claim that I is a YES-instance of 3-PARTITION iff R(S) = 0, i.e., the total regret of the allocation S is zero. (=⇒): Suppose R(S) = 0. This implies the regret of every advertiser must be zero, i.e., Πi(Si) = Bi = C/m. We shall show that in this case, each Si must consist of 3 "U " nodes whose spread sums to C/m. From this, it follows that the 3-element subsets Xi := {xj ∈ X | uj ∈ Si} witness the fact that I is a YESinstance. Suppose |Si| = 3 for some i. It is trivial to see that each seed set Si can contain only the "U " nodes, for the spread of any "V " node is just 1. If |Si| = 3, then Πi(Si) = u j ∈S i xj = C/m, since all numbers are in the open interval (C/4m, C/2m). This shows that every seed set Si in the above allocation must have size 3, which was to be shown. (⇐=): Suppose X1, ..., Xm are disjoint 3-element subsets of X that each sum to C/m. By choosing the corresponding "U "-nodes we get a seed set allocation whose total regret is zero.
We just proved that REGRET-MINIMIZATION is NP-hard. To see hardness of approximation, suppose B is an algorithm that approximates REGRET-MINIMIZATION within a factor of α. That is, the regret achieved by algorithm B on any instance of REGRET-MINIMIZATION is ≤ α · OP T , where OP T is the optimal (least) regret. Using the same reduction as above, we can see that the optimal regret on the reduced instance J above is 0. On this instance, the regret achieved by algorithm B is ≤ α·0 = 0, i.e., algorithm B can solve REGRET-MINIMIZATION optimally in polynomial time, which is shown above to be impossible unless P = N P .
A Greedy Algorithm
Due to the hardness of approximation of Problem 1, no polynomial algorithm can provide any theoretical guarantees w.r.t. optimal overall regret. Still, instead of jumping to heuristics without any guarantee, we present an intuitive greedy algorithm (pseudocode in Algorithm 1) with theoretical guarantees in terms of the total budget. It is worth noting that analyzing regret w.r.t. the total Algorithm 1: Greedy Algorithm
budget has real-world relevance, as budget is a concrete monetary and known quantity (unlike optimal value of regret) which makes it easy to understand regret from a business perspective. The algorithm starts by initializing all seed sets to be empty (line 1). It keeps selecting and allocating seeds until regret can no longer be minimized. In each iteration, it finds a user-advertiser pair (u, ai) such that u's attention bound is not reached (that is, |{Si|u ∈ Si}| < κu) and adding u to Si (the seed set of ai) yields the largest decrease in regret among all valid pairs. Clearly, we want to ensure that regret does not increase in an iteration (that is, Ri(Si ∪ {u}) < Ri(Si)) (line 3). The user u is then added to Si. If no such pair can be found, that is, regret cannot be reduced further, the algorithm terminates (line 4).
Before stating our results on bounding the overall regret achieved by the greedy algorithm, we identify extreme (and unrealistic) situations where no such guarantees may be possible. Practical considerations. Consider a network with n users, one advertiser with a CPE of 1 and a budget B n. Assume CTPs are all 1. Clearly, even if all n users are allocated to the advertiser, the regret approaches 100% of B, as most of the budget cannot be tapped. At another extreme, consider a dense network with n users (e.g., clique), one advertiser with a cpe of 1 and a budget B n. Suppose the network has high influence probabilities, with the result that assigning any one seed u to the advertiser will result in an expected revenue Π({u}) B. In this case, the allocation with the least regret is the empty allocation (!) and the regret is exactly B! In many practical settings, the budgets are large enough that the marginal gain of any one node is a small fraction of the budget and small enough compared to the network size, in that there are enough nodes in the network to allocate to each advertiser in order to exhaust or exceed the budget.
The General Case
In this subsection, we establish an upper bound on the regret achieved by Algorithm 1, when every candidate seed has essentially an unlimited attention bound. For convenience, we refer to the first term in the definition of regret (cf. Eq. 3) as budget-regret and the second term as seed-regret. The first one reflects the regret arising from undershooting or overshooting the budget and the second arises from utilizing seeds which are the host's resources. For a seed set Si for ad i, the marginal gain of a node x ∈ V \ Si is defined as M Gi(x|Si) := Πi(Si ∪{x})−Πi(Si). By submodularity, the marginal gain of any node is the greatest w.r.t. the empty seed set, i.e., M Gi(x|∅) = Πi({x}). Let pi be the maximum marginal gain of any node w.r.t. ad i, as a fraction of its budget Bi, i.e., pi := maxx∈V Πi({x})/Bi. As discussed at the end of the previous subsection, we assume that the network and the budgets are such that pi ∈ (0, 1), for all ads i. In practice, pi tends to be a small fraction of the budget Bi. Finally, we define pmax := max h i=1 pi to be the maximum pi among all advertisers. THEOREM 2. Suppose that for every node u, the attention bound κu ≥ h, the number of advertisers, and that λ ≤ δ(u, i) · cpe(i), ∀ user u and ad i. Then the regret incurred by Algorithm 1 upon termination is at most
where s i opt is the smallest number of seeds required for reaching or exceeding the budget Bi for ad i.
Discussion:
The term δ(u, i) · cpe(i) corresponds to the expected revenue from user u clicking on i (without considering the network effect). Thus, the assumption on λ, that it is no more than the expected revenue from any one user clicking on an ad, keeps the penalty term small, since in practice click-through probabilities tend to be small. Secondly, the regret bound given by the theorem can be understood as follows. Upon termination, the budget-regret from Greedy's allocation is at most (1/2)pmaxB (plus a small constant λ/2). The theorem says that Greedy achieves such a budgetregret while being frugal w.r.t. the number of seeds it uses. Indeed, its seed-regret is bounded by the minimum number of needs that an optimal algorithm would use to reach the budget, multiplied by a logarithmic factor. PROOF OF THEOREM 2. We establish a series of claims. PROOF OF CLAIM: Let x be a node such that its addition to Si strictly reduces the budget-regret and it results in the greatest reduction in budget-regret, among all nodes outside Si. The contribution of every node outside Si to the seed regret (i.e., the penalty term) is the same and is equal to λ. Thus, any node that achieves the maximum budget-regret reduction will have the maximum overall regret reduction. Furthermore, the overall regret reduction of adding such a node x to Si will be non-negative, since its contribution to budgetregret reduction is at least 1 · δ(u, i) · cpe(u, i) ≥ λ. So Greedy will add such a node x to Si. Attention bound does not constrain this addition in anyway since κu ≥ h, ∀u. (=⇒): Let x be the node added by Greedy to Si. By definition, the addition of x to Si results in a non-negative reduction in overall regret and it leads to the maximum overall regret reduction. By the argument in the "If" direction, x must also lead to the maximum reduction in the budget-regret, since seed-regret cannot discriminate between nodes. We will show that this reduction is strictly positive. Since Greedy added x to Si, we have
This was to be shown. 
Clearly, x must be the last seed added to Si, as any future additions will strictly raise the regret. By submodularity, we have
By combining both cases, we conclude that the budget-regret of Greedy for ai upon termination is ≤ (piBi + λ)/2.
Next, define η0 = Bi. Let S j i be the seed set assigned to advertiser ai by Greedy after iteration j. Let ηj := η0 − Πi(S j i ), i.e., the shortfall of the achieved revenue w.r.t. the budget Bi, after iteration j, for advertiser ai.
where s i opt is the minimum number of seeds needed to achieve a revenue no less than Bi. PROOF OF CLAIM: Suppose otherwise. Let S * i be the seeds allocated to advertiser ai by the optimal algorithm for achieving a revenue no less than Bi. Add seeds in S * i \ S j i one by one to S j i . Since none of them has a marginal gain w.r.t. Si that is ≥ 1/s i opt · ηj, it follows by submodularity that Πi(S j i ∪ S * i ) ≤ Π(S j i ) + s i opt · 1/s i opt · ηj < Bi, a contradiction. It follows from the above proof that ηj ≤ ηj−1 · (1 − 1/s i opt ), which implies that ηj ≤ 1/ηj−1 · e −1/s i opt . Unwinding, we get ηj ≤ η0 · e −j/s i opt . Suppose Greedy stops in iterations. We showed above that the budget-regret of Greedy, for advertiser ai, at the end of this iteration, is either at most (pi · Bi + λ)/2 or is at most (piBi −λ)/2 depending on the case that applies. Of these, the latter is more stringent w.r.t. the #iterations Greedy will take, and hence w.r.t. the #seeds it will allocate to ai. So, in iteration − 1,
Notice that this is an upper bound on |S i |. We just proved CLAIM 4. When Greedy terminates, the seed-regret for advertiser ai, upon termination, is at most λ · (1 + s i opt · ln{1/(pi/2 − λ/2Bi)} ). 
Combining all the claims above, we can infer that the overall regret of Greedy upon termination is at most
h i=1 (piBi + λ)/2 + λ h i=1 [1 + s i opt (1 + ln{1/(pi/2 − λ/2Bi)} .
The Case of λ = 0
In this subsection, we focus on the regret bound achieved by Greedy in the special case that λ = 0, i.e., the overall regret is just the budget-regret. While the results here can be more or less seen as special cases of Theorem 2, it is illuminating to restrict attention to this special case. Our first result follows. THEOREM 3. Consider an instance of REGRET-MINIMIZATION that admits a seed allocation whose total regret is bounded by a third of the total budget. Then Algorithm 1 outputs an allocation S with a total regret R(S) ≤ 1
Bi is the total budget. PROOF. Consider an arbitrary iteration of Algorithm 1, where the algorithm assigns a node, say u, to advertiser ai, i.e., it adds u to the seed set Si. In particular, notice that u has been assigned to < κu advertisers before this iteration, where κu is the attention bound of u. Three cases arise as shown in Figure 2 .
Case 1: 2 3 Bi ≤ Πi(Si ∪ {u}) ≤ 4 3 Bi. In this case, clearly, the regret for this advertiser is |Πi
Bi. Consider the next iteration in which another seed, say u , is assigned to the same advertiser ai, i.e., u is to Si. Clearly, the marginal gain of u w.r.t. Si ∪ {u} cannot be more than 2 3 Bi, by submodularity. Thus, Πi(Si ∪ {u, u }) < 4 3 Bi. Now, if Πi(Si ∪ {u, u }) ≥ 2 3 Bi, then by Case 1, we have that the regret of advertiser ai is at most 1 3 Bi. Otherwise, Πi(Si ∪ {u, u }) < 2 3 Bi, and then it is similar to Case 2 condition, where u is also added to Si after u. In this case, subsequent iterations of the algorithm grow Si until Case 1 is satisfied. A simple inductive argument shows that the regret for advertiser ai is no more that 1 3 Bi. Case 3: Πi(Si ∪ {u}) > 4 3 Bi. The algorithm adds u to Si only when Πi(Si ∪ {u}) − Bi < Bi − Πi(Si), which implies Πi(Si ∪ {u}) + Πi(Si) < 2Bi. 5 However, since Πi(Si ∪ {u}) > 4 3 Bi, this implies Πi(Si) < 2 3 Bi. This means the marginal gain of u w.r.t. Si, i.e., Πi(Si ∪ {u}) − Πi(Si), is larger than 2 3 Bi. However, Πi(Si) < 2 3 Bi, which by submoduarity, implies no subsequent seed can have a marginal gain of 2 3 Bi or more, a contradiction. Thus, Case 3 is impossible.
We just showed that for any advertiser, the regret achieved by the algorithm is at most 1 3 Bi. Summing over all advertisers, we see that the overall regret is no more than 1 3 B.
The regret bound established above is conservative, and unlike Theorem 2, does not make any assumptions about the marginal gains of seed nodes. In practice, as previously noted, most real networks tend to have low influence probabilities and consequently, the marginal gain of any single node tends to be a small fraction of the budget. Using this, we can establish a tighter bound on the regret achieved by Greedy. THEOREM 4. On any input instance that admits an allocation with total regret bounded by min{ pmax 2 , 1−pmax}·B, Algorithm 1 delivers an allocation S so that R(S) ≤ min{ pmax 2 , 1−pmax}·B. PROOF. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3. Consider an arbitrary iteration of Algorithm 1. Suppose u is the seed that the algorithm assigned to ai (i.e., added to seed set Si) in this iteration. The following two cases arise. Case 1: Πi(Si ∪ {u}) < pi · Bi. Then, the algorithm will continue to add seeds to the seed set Si, until the condition of Case 2 is met. Case 2: Πi(Si ∪ {u}) ≥ pi · Bi. There can be two sub-cases in this scenario:
If u is the last seed added to the seed set Si, then we have regret ≤ (1 − pi)Bi. Moreover, u being the last seed also implies that for any other node u ∈ Si, we have
since otherwise, the algorithm would have added u to Si to decrease the regret. Also, due to submodularity,
Therefore, in Case 2a, if u is the last seed selected by the algorithm, then regret of advertiser ai is min{ p i 2 , 1 − pi} · Bi. Otherwise, the algorithm would continue with the next iteration and add seeds until Case 2a or Case 2b is satisfied. Case 2b: Πi(Si ∪ {u}) > Bi. Then regret for advertiser ai is Πi(Si ∪ {u}) − Bi.
In this case, u must be the last seed selected by the algorithm as adding another seed can only increase the regret. Therefore, it is clear that
Moreover, due to submodularity, we know that
Combining Cases 2a and 2b, and summing it over all advertisers, it is easy to see that total regret is ≤ min( pmax 2 , (1 − pmax)) · B.
We note that this claim generalizes Theorem 3. In fact, the two bounds: pmax 2 and 1−pmax meet at the value of 1/3 when pmax = 2/3. In practice, pmax may be much smaller, making the bound better.
SCALABLE ALGORITHMS
Algorithm 1 (Greedy) involves a large number of calls to influence spread computations, to find the node for each advertiser ai that yields the maximum decrease in regret Ri(Si). Given any seed set S, computing its exact influence spread σ(S) under the IC model is #P-hard [7] , and this hardness trivially carries over to the topic-aware IC model [3] with CTPs. A common practice is to use Monte Carlo (MC) simulations to estimate influence spread [19] . However, accurate estimation requires a large number of MC simulations, which is prohibitively expensive and not scalable. Thus, to make Algorithm 1 scalable, we need an alternative approach.
In the influence maximization literature, considerable effort has been devoted to developing more efficient and scalable algorithms [5, 7, 8, 18, 25] . Of these, the IRIE algorithm proposed by Jung et al. [18] is a state-of-the-art heuristic for influence maximization under the IC model and is orders of magnitude faster than MC simulations. We thus use a variant of Greedy, GREEDY-IRIE, where IRIE replaces MC simulations for spread estimation. It is one of the strong baselines we will compare our main algorithm with in §6. In this section, we instead propose a scalable algorithm with guaranteed approximation for influence spread.
Recently, Borgs et al. [5] proposed a quasi-linear time randomized algorithm based on the idea of sampling "reverse-reachable" (RR) sets in the graph. It was improved to a near-linear time randomized algorithm -Two-phase Influence Maximization (TIM)by Tang et al. [25] . Cohen et al. [8] proposed a sketch-based design for fast computation of influence spread, achieving efficiency and effectiveness comparable to TIM. We choose to extend TIM as it is the current state-of-the-art influence maximization algorithm and is more adapted to our needs.
In this section, we adapt the essential ideas from Greedy, RRsets sampling, and the TIM algorithm to devise an algorithm for REGRET-MINIMIZATION, called Two-phase Iterative Regret Minimization (TIRM for short), that is much more efficient and scalable than Algorithm 1 with MC simulations. Our adaptation to TIM is non-trivial, since TIM relies on knowing the exact number of seeds required. In our framework, the number of seeds needed is driven by the budget and the current regret and so is dynamic. We first give the background on RR-sets sampling, review the TIM algorithm [25] , and then describe our TIRM algorithm.
Reverse-Reachable Sets and TIM
RR-sets Sampling: Brief Review. We first review the definition of RR-sets, which is the backbone of both TIM and our proposed TIRM algorithm. Conceptually speaking, a random RR-set R from G is generated as follows. First, for every edge (u, v) ∈ E, remove it from G w.p. 1 − pu,v: this generates a possible world X. Second, pick a target node w uniformly at random from V . Then, R consists of the nodes that can reach w in X. This can be implemented efficiently by first choosing a target node w ∈ V uniformly at random and performing a breadth-first search (BFS) starting from it. Initially, create an empty BFS-queue Q, and insert all of w's inneighbors into Q. The following loop is executed until Q is empty: Dequeue a node u from Q and examine its incoming edges: for
All nodes dequeued from Q thus form a RR-set.
The intuition behind RR-sets sampling is that, if we have sampled sufficiently many RR-sets, and a node u appears in a large number of RR sets, then u is likely to have high influence spread in the original graph and is a good candidate seed. TIM: Brief Review. Given an input graph G = (V, E) with influence probabilities and desired seed set size s, TIM, in its first phase, computes a lower bound on the optimal influence spread of any seed set of size s, i.e., OP Ts := max S⊆V,|S|=s σ ic (S). Here σ ic (S) refers to the spread w.r.t. classic IC model. TIM then uses this lower bound to estimate the number of random RR-sets that need to be generated, denoted θ. In its second phase, TIM simply samples θ RR-sets, denoted R, and uses them to select s seeds, by solving the Max s-Cover problem: find s nodes, that between them, appear in the maximum number of sets in R. This is solved using a well-known greedy procedure: start with an empty set and repeatedly add a node that appears in the maximum number of sets in R that are not yet "covered".
TIM provides a (1 − 1/e − )-approximation to the optimal solution OP Ts with high probability. Also, its time complexity is O((s + )(|V | + |E|) log |V |/ 2 ), while that of the greedy algorithm (for influence maximization) is Ω(k|V ||E| · poly( −1 )). Theoretical Guarantees of TIM. Consider any collection of random RR-sets, denoted R. Given any seed set S, we define F R (S) as the fraction of R covered by S, where S covers an RR-set iff it overlaps it. The following proposition says that for any S, |V | · F R (S) is an unbiased estimator of σ ic (S).
PROPOSITION 1 (COROLLARY 1, [25] ). Let S ⊆ V be any set of nodes, and R be a collection of random RR sets. Then,
The next proposition shows the accuracy of influence spread estimation and the approximation gurantee of TIM. Given any seed set size s and ε > 0, define L(s, ε) to be:
where > 0, > 0. [25] ). Let θ be a number no less than L(s, ε). Then for any seed set S with |S| ≤ s, the following inequality holds w.p. at least 1 − n − / n s :
Moreover, with this θ, TIM returns a (1 − 1/e − )-approximation to OP Ts w.p. 1 − n − .
This result intuitively says that as long as we sample enough RR-sets, i.e., |R| ≥ θ, the absolute error of using |V | · F R (S) to estimate σ ic (S) is bounded by a fraction of OP Ts with high probability. Furthermore, this gives approximation guarantees for influence maximization. Next, we describe how to extend the ideas of RR-sets sampling and TIM for regret minimization.
Two-phase Iterative Regret Minimization
A straightforward application of TIM for solving REGRET-MINIMIZATION will not work. There are two critical challenges. First, TIM requires the number of seeds s as input, while the input of REGRET-MINIMIZATION is in the form of monetary budgets, and thus we do not know the precise number of seeds that should be allocated to each advertiser beforehand. Second, our influence propagation model has click-through probabilities (CTPs) of seeds, namely δ(u, i)'s. This is not accounted for in the RR-sets sampling method: it implicitly assumes that each seed becomes active w.p. 1.
We first discuss how to adapt RR-sets sampling to incorporate CTPs. Then we deal with unknown seed set sizes. RR-sets Sampling with Click-Through Probabilities. Recall that in our model, when a node u is chosen as a seed for advertiser ai, it has a probability δ(u, i) to accept being seeded, i.e., to actually click on the ad.
For ease of exposition, in the rest of this subsubsection only, we assume that there is only one advertiser, and the CTP of each user u for this advertiser is simply δ(u) ∈ [0, 1]. The technique we discuss and our results readily extend to any number of advertisers. A naive way to incorporate CTPs is as follows. For all u ∈ V , w.p. δ(u), mark it "live", and w.p. 1 − δ(u), mark it "blocked". After that, generate RR-sets as described in the previous subsection, with an additional check, whether a node is live. Precisely, unless both node v is live and the associated edge e = (u, v) has a positive outcome (w.p. p(e)), u will not be added to the BFS queue in the RR-set generation process.
For clarity, call the random RR-sets generated with CTPs incorporated as above, RR-Sets with CTPs (RRC-sets for short). Let Q be a collection of RRC-sets. Similar to F R (S), for any set S, we define F Q (S) to be the fraction of Q that overlap with S. Let σ icctp (S) be the influence spread of a seed set S under the IC model with CTPs. We first establish a similar result to Proposition 1 which says that |V |F Q (S) is an unbiased estimator of σ(S). PROOF. We show the following equality holds:
The LHS of (7) equals to the probability that a node chosen uniformly at random can be activated by seed set S where a seed u ∈ S may become live with CTP δ(u), while the RHS of (7) equals to the probability that S intersects with a random RRC-set. They both equal to the probability that a randomly chosen node is reachable by S in a possible world corresponding to the IC-CTP model.
In principle, RRC-sets are those we should work with for the purpose of seed selection for REGRET-MINIMIZATION. However, note that by Equation (5) and Proposition 2, the number of samples required is inversely proportional to the value of the optimal solution OP Ts. However, in reality, click-through rates on ads are quite low, and thus OP Ts, taking CTPs into account, will decrease by at least two orders of magnitude (e.g., OP Ts with CTP 0.01 would become 100 times smaller than OP Ts with CTP 1). This in turn translates into at least two orders of magnitude more RRC-sets to be sampled, which ruins scalability.
An alternative way of incorporating CTPs is to pretend as though all CTPs were 1. We still generate RR-sets, and use the estimations given by RR-sets to compute revenue. More specifically, for any S ⊆ V and any u ∈ V \ S, we compute the marginal gain of u w.r.t. S, namely σC (S ∪ {u}) − σC (S), by δ(u) · |V | · [F R (S ∪ {u}) − F R (S)]. This avoids sampling of numerous RRC-sets.
We can show that in expectation, computing marginal gain in IC-CTP model using RRC-sets is essentially equivalent to computing it under the IC model using RR-sets in the manner above. THEOREM 5. Consider any u ∈ S and any S ⊆ V . Let δ(u) be the probability that u accepts to become a seed. Let R and Q be a collection of RR-sets and of RRC-sets, respectively. Then,
PROOF. Consider a random RR-set X, and define an indicator function IX (u, S), which takes on 1 if u ∈ X and S ∩ X = ∅, and 0 otherwise. Then, we have
where P r[X] is the probability of sampling the RR-set X. Each RR-set X will be split into two RRC-sets: Xu w.p. δ(u), in which u is live, and Xū w.p. 1−δ(u), in which u is blocked. Every RRC-set can be generated from an RR-set in this way. Now, we have
where we have applied (8) in the last equality. This completes the proof.
This theorem shows even with CTPs, we can still use the usual RR-sets sampling process for estimating spread efficiently and accurately as long as we multiply marginal gains by CTPs. This result carries over to the setting of multiple advertisers.
Iterative Seed Set Size Estimation. As mentioned earlier, TIM needs the required number of seeds s as input, which is not available for the REGRET-MINIMIZATION problem. From the advertiser budgets, there is no obvious way to determine the number of seeds. This poses a challenge since the required number of RR-sets (θ) depends on s. To circumvent this difficulty, we propose a framework which first makes an initial guess at s, and then iteratively revises the estimated value, until no more seeds are needed, while concurrently selecting seeds and allocating them to advertisers.
For ease of exposition, let us first consider a single advertiser ai. Let Bi be the budget of ai and let si be the true number of seeds required to minimize the regret for ai. We do not know si and estimate it in successive iterations ass t i . We start with an estimated value for si, denotedsi 1 , and use it to obtain a corresponding θ 1 i (cf. Proposition 2). If θ t i > θ t−1 i , 6 we will need to sample an additional (θ t i − θ t−1 i ) RR-sets, and use all RR-sets sampled up to this iteration to select (s t i −s t−1 i ) additional seeds. After adding those seeds, if ai's budget Bi is not yet reached, this means more seeds can be assigned to ai. Thus, we will need another iteration and we further revise our estimation of si. The new value,s t+1 i , is obtained by adding tos t i the floor function of the ratio between the current regret Ri(Si) and the marginal revenue contributed by thes t i -th seed (i.e., the latest seed). This ensures we do not overestimate, thanks to submodularity, as future seeds have diminishing marginal gains. Algorithm 2 outlines TIRM, which integrates the iterated seed set size estimation technique above, suitably adapted to multiadvertiser setting, along with the RR-set based coverage estimation idea of TIM, and uses Theorem 5 to deal with CTPs. Notice that the core logic of the algorithm is still based on greedy seed selection as outlined in Algorithm 1. Algorithm TIRM works as follows. For every advertiser ai, we initially set its seed budget si to be 1 (a conservative, but safe estimate), and find the first seed using random RR-sets generated accordingly (line 3). In the main loop, we follow the greedy selection logic of Algorithm 1. That is, every time, we identify the valid user-advertiser pair (u, ai) that gives the largest decrease in total regret and allocate u to Si (lines 6 to 12), paying attention to the attention bound of u (line 1 of Algorithm 3). If |Si| reaches the current estimate of si after we add u, then we increase si by Ri(Si)/(cpe(i) · n · F R i (u)) (lines 14 to 19), as described above, as long as the regret continues to decrease. Note that after adding additional RR-sets, we should update the spread estimation of current seeds w.r.t. the new collection of RR-sets (line 18). This ensures that future marginal gain computations and selections are accurate. This is effectively a lower bound 6 Assuming θ 0 i = 0, i = 1, . . . , h.
Algorithm 2: TIRM
Input : G = (V, E); attention bounds κu, ∀u ∈ V ; items γ i with cpe(i) & budget B i , i = 1, . . . , h; CTPs δ(u, i), ∀u∀i Output: S 1 , · · · , S h 1 foreach j = 1, 2, . . . , h do 2 S j ← ∅; Q j ← ∅; // a priority queue 3 s j ← 1; θ j ← L(s j , ε); R j ← Sample(G, γ j , θ j ); 4 while true do 5 foreach j = 1, 2, . . . , h do
; //find the (user, ad) pair with max drop in regret. 9 if i = NULL then
for ad a j as well as its coverage.
Algorithm 4: UpdateEstimates(Ri, θi, Si, Qi) THEOREM 6. At any iteration t of iterative seed set size estimation in Algorithm TIRM, for any set Si of at most s = t j=1 s j nodes, |n · F R t (Si) − σi(Si)| < ε 2 · OP Ts holds with probability at least 1 − n − / n s , where σi(S) is the expected spread of seed set Si for ad i.
PROOF. When t = 1, our claim follows directly from Proposition 2. When t > 1, by definition of our iterative sampling process, the number of RR-sets, |R t |, is equal to maxj=1,...,t Lj, where Lj = L j a=1 s a , ε . This means that at any iteration t, the number of RR-sets is always sufficient for Eq. (6) to hold. Hence, for the set Si containing seeds accumulated up to iteration t, our claim on the absolute error in the estimated spread of Si holds, by virtue of Proposition 2.
EXPERIMENTS
We conduct an empirical evaluation of the proposed algorithms. The goal is manifold. First, we would like to evaluate the quality of the algorithms as measured by the regret achieved, the number of seeds they used to achieve a certain level of budget-regret, and the extent to which the attention bound (κ) and the penalty factor (λ) affect their performance. Second, we evaluate the efficiency and scalability of the algorithms w.r.t. advertiser budgets, which indirectly control the number of seeds required, and w.r.t. the number of advertisers. We measure both running time and memory usage.
Datasets.
Our experiments are based on four real-world social networks, whose basic statistics are summarized in Table 1 . Of the four datasets, we use FLIXSTER and EPINIONS for our quality experiments and DBLP and LIVEJOURNAL for scalability experiments. FLIXSTER is from a social movie-rating site (http: //www.flixster.com/). The dataset records movie ratings from users along with their timestamps. We use the topic-aware influence probabilities and the item-specific topic distributions provided by the authors of [3] , who learned the probabilities using maximum likelihood estimation for the TIC model with K = 10 latent topics. In our quality experiments, we set the number of advertisers h to be 10, and used 10 of the learnt topic distributions from Flixster dataset, where for each ad i , its topic distribution γi has mass 0.91 in the i-th topic, and 0.01 in all others. CTPs are sampled uniformly at random from the interval [0.01, 0.03] for all user-ad pairs, in keeping with real-life CTPs (see §1).
EPINIONS is a who-trusts-whom network taken from a consumer review website (http://www.epinions.com/). For Epinions, we similarly set h = 10 and use K = 10 latent topics. For each ad i, we use synthetic topic distributions γi, by borrowing the ones used in FLIXSTER. For all edges and topics, the topicaware influence probabilities are sampled from an exponential distribution with mean 30, via the inverse transform technique [11] on the values sampled randomly from uniform distribution U(0, 1).
For scalability experiments, we adopt two large networks DBLP and LIVEJOURNAL (both are available at http://snap. stanford.edu/). DBLP is a co-authorship graph (undirected) where nodes represent authors and there is an edge between two nodes if they have co-authored a paper indexed by DBLP. We direct In all datasets, advertiser budgets and CPEs are chosen in such a way that the total number of seeds required for all ads to meet their budgets is less than n. This ensures no ads are assigned empty seed sets. For lack of space, we do not enumerate all the numbers, but rather give a statistical summary in Table 2 . Notice that since the CTPs are in the 1-3% range, the effective number of targeted nodes is correspondingly larger. We defer the numbers for DBLP and LIVEJOURNAL to §6.2.
All experiments were run on a 64-bit RedHat Linux server with Intel Xeon 2.40GHz CPU and 65GB memory. Our largest configuration is LIVEJOURNAL with 20 ads, which effectively has 69M · 20 = 1.4B edges; this is comparable with [25] , whose largest dataset has 1.5B edges (Twitter). Algorithms. We test and compare the following four algorithms.
• MYOPIC: A baseline that assigns every user u ∈ V in total κu most relevant ads i, i.e., those for which u has the highest expected revenue, not considering any network effect, i.e., δ(u, i) · cpe(i). It is called "myopic" as it solely focuses on CTPs and CPEs and effectively ignores virality and budgets. Allocation A in Fig. 1 follows this baseline.
•MYOPIC+: This is an enhanced version of MYOPIC which takes budgets, but not virality, into account. For each ad, it first ranks users w.r.t. CTPs and then selects seeds using this order until budget is exhausted. User attention bounds are taken into account by going through the ads round-robin and advancing to the next seed if the current node u is already assigned to κu ads.
• GREEDY-IRIE: An instantiation of Algorithm 1, with the IRIE heuristic [18] used for influence spread estimation and seed selection. IRIE has a damping factor α for accurately estimating influence spread in its framework. Jung et al. [18] report that α = 0.7 performs best on the datasets they tested. We did extensive testing on our datasets and found that α = 0.8 gave the best spread estimation, and thus used 0.8 in all quality experiments.
• TIRM: Algorithm 2. We set ε to be 0.1 for quality experiments on FLIXSTER and EPINIONS, and 0.2 for scalability experiments on DBLP and LIVEJOURNAL (following [25] ).
For all algorithms, we evaluate the final regret of their output seed sets using Monte Carlo simulations (10K runs) for neutral, fair, and accurate comparisons.
Results of Quality Experiments
Overall regret. First, we compare overall regret (as defined in Eq. (4)) against attention bound κu, varied from 1 to 5, with two choices 0 and 0.5 for λ. Fig. 3 shows that the overall regret (in logscale) achieved by TIRM and GREEDY-IRIE are significantly lower than that of MYOPIC and MYOPIC+. For example, on FLIXSTER with λ = 0 and κu = 1, overall regrets of TIRM, GREEDY-IRIE, MYOPIC, and MYOPIC+, expressed relative to the total budget, are 2.5%, 26.1%, 122%, 141%, respectively. On EPINIONS with the same setting, the corresponding regrets are 6.5%, 15.9%, 145%, and 205%. MYOPIC, and MYOPIC+ typically always overshoot the budgets as they are not vitality-aware when choosing seeds. Notice that even though MYOPIC+ is budget conscious, it still ends up overshooting the budget as a result of not factoring in virality in seed allocation. In almost all cases, overall regret by TIRM goes down as κu increases. The trend for MYOPIC and MYOPIC+ is the opposite, caused by their larger overshooting with larger κu. This is because they will select more seeds as κu goes up, which causes higher revenue (hence regret) due to more virality. We also vary λ to be 0, 0.1, 0.5, and 1 and show the overall regrets under those values in Fig. 4 (also in log-scale), with two choices 1 and 5 for κu. As expected, in all test cases as λ increases, the overall regret also goes up. The hierarchy of algorithms (in terms of performance) remains the same as in Fig. 3 , with TIRM being the consistent winner. Note that even when λ is as high as 1, TIRM still wins and performs well. This suggests that the λassumption (λ ≤ δ(u, i) · cpe(i), ∀ user u and ad i) in Theorem 2 is conservative as TIRM can still achieve relatively low regret even with large λ values.
Drilling down to individual regrets. Having compared overall regrets, we drill down into the budget-regrets (see §4) achieved for different individual ads by TIRM and GREEDY-IRIE. Fig. 5 shows the distribution of budget-regrets across advertisers for both algorithms. On FLIXSTER, both algorithms overshoot for all ads, but the distribution of TIRM-regrets is much more uniform than that of GREEDY-IRIE-regrets. E.g., for the fourth ad, GREEDY-IRIE even achieves a smaller regret than TIRM, but for all other ads, their GREEDY-IRIE-regret is at least 3.8 times as large as the TIRM-regret, showing a heavy skew. On EPINIONS, TIRM slightly overshoots for all advertisers as in the case of FLIXSTER, while GREEDY-IRIE falls short on 7 out of 10 ads and its budget-regrets are larger than TIRM for most advertisers. Note that MYOPIC and MYOPIC+ are not included here as Figs. 3 and 4 have clearly demonstrated that they have significantly higher overshooting 7 . Number of targeted users. We now look into the distinct number of nodes targeted at least once by each algorithm, as κu increases from 1 to 5. Intuitively, as κu decreases, each node becomes "less available", and thus we may need more distinct nodes to cover all budgets, causing this measure to go up. The stats in Table 3 confirm this intuition, in the case of TIRM, GREEDY-IRIE, and MYOPIC+. MYOPIC is an exception since it allocates an ad to every user (i.e., all |V | nodes are targeted). Note that on EPINIONS, TIRM targeted more nodes than GREEDY-IRIE. The reason is that GREEDY-IRIE tends to overestimate influence spread on EPINIONS, resulting in pre-mature termination of Greedy. When MC is used to estimate ground-truth spread, the revenue would fall short of budgets (see Fig. 5 ). The behavior of GREEDY-IRIE is completely the opposite on FLIXSTER, showing its lack of consistency as a pure heuristic.
Results of Scalability Experiments
We test the scalability of TIRM and GREEDY-IRIE on DBLP and LIVEJOURNAL. For simplicity, we set all CPEs and CTPs to 1 and λ to 0, and the values of these parameters do not affect running time or memory usage. Influence probabilities on each edge (u, v) ∈ E are computed using the Weighted-Cascade model [7] : p i u,v = 1 |N in (v)| for all ads i. We set α = 0.7 for GREEDY-IRIE and ε = 0.2 for TIRM, in accordance with the settings in [18, 25] . Attention bound κu = 1 for all users. We emphasize that our setting is fair and ideal for testing scalability as it simulates a fully competitive 7 Their regrets are all from overshooting the budget on account of ignoring virality effects. case: all advertisers compete for the same set of influential users (due to all ads having the same distribution over the topics) and the attention bound is at its lowest, which in turn will "stress-test" the algorithms by prolonging the seed selection process. We test the running time of the algorithms in two dimensions: Fig. 6(a At the outset, notice that TIRM significantly outperforms GREEDY-IRIE in terms of running time. Furthermore, as shown in Fig. 6(a) , the gap between TIRM and GREEDY-IRIE on DBLP becomes larger as h increases. For example, when h = 1, both algorithms finish in 60 secs, but when h = 15, TIRM is 6 times faster than GREEDY-IRIE.
On LIVEJOURNAL, TIRM scales almost linearly w.r.t. the number of advertisers, It took about 16 minutes with h = 1 (47 seeds chosen) and 5 hours with h = 20 (4649 seeds). GREEDY-IRIE took about 6 hours to complete for h = 1, and did not finish after 48 hours for h ≥ 5. When budgets increase ( Fig. 6(b) ), GREEDY-IRIE's time will go up (super-linearly) due to more iterations of seed selections, but TIRM remains relatively stable (barring some minor fluctuations). On LIVEJOURNAL, TIRM took less than 75 minutes with Bi = 50K (254 seeds). Note that once h is fixed, TIRM's running time depends heavily on the required number of random RR-sets (θ) for each advertiser rather than budgets, as seed selection is a linear-time operation for a given sample of RR-sets. Thus, the relatively stable trend on Fig. 6 (b) & 6(d) is due to the subtle interplay among the variables to compute L(s, ε) (Eq. 5); similar observations were made for TIM in [25] . Table 4 shows the memory usage of TIRM and GREEDY-IRIE. As TIRM relies on generating a large number of random RRsets for accurate estimation of influence spread, we observe high memory consumption by this algorithm, similar to the TIM algorithm [25] . The usage steadily increases with h. The memory usage of GREEDY-IRIE is modest, as its computation requires merely the input graph and probabilities. However, GREEDY-IRIE is a heuristic with no guarantees, which is reflected in its relatively poor re- gret performance compared to TIRM. Furthermore, as seen earlier, TIRM scales significantly better than GREEDY-IRIE on all datasets.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we build a bridge between viral marketing and social advertising, by drawing on the viral marketing literature to study influence-aware ad allocation for social advertising, under real-world business model, paying attention to important practical factors like relevance, social proof, user attention bound, and advertiser budget. In particular, we study the problem of regret minimization from the host perspective, characterize its hardness and devise a simple scalable algorithm with quality guarantees w.r.t. the total budget. Through extensive experiments we demonstrate its superior performance over natural baselines.
Our work takes a first step toward enriching the framework of social advertising by integrating it with powerful ideas from viral marketing and making the latter more applicable to real online marketing problems. It opens up several interesting avenues for further research. Studying continuous-time propagation models, possibly with the network and/or influence probabilities not known beforehand (and to be learned), and possibly in presence of hard competition constraints, is a direction that offers a wealth of possibilities for future work.
